Document Title Government Code and Cypher School: Signals Intelligence Passed to the Prime Minister, Messages and Correspondence
Reference HW 1/3682
Conflicts Second World War
Themes Military Intelligence and Operations, Foreign Policy and International Relations
Regions Atlantic, East Asia, Europe, Latin America, Mediterranean, North America, South Asia
Countries Argentina, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Soviet Union, Spain, United States of America
Document Type Signals Intelligence
Organisations Chiefs of Staff, Security Service, Government Code and Cypher School
People Edward Bridges, Karl Dönitz, Adolf Hitler, Joachim von Ribbentrop


A file of signals intelligence reports, messages, and correspondence issued by the Government Code and Cypher School and sent by the head ('C') of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. This file includes the following reports on Western Europe: that the Commander in Chief (C-in-C) West orders a besieged garrison not to break out from Kassel but to remain until its fighting efficiency has been decisively impaired, on April 5; of a German planned attack towards Eisenach being postponed for 24 hours, on April 6; that all reserves of the 88th Corps were committed to the front by April 5, and unable to defend the front of the 6th Parachute Division from Allied penetrations in the Zutphen area; that the C-in-C West informs Army Groups B, G and H that because of production problems only 75% of the previous tank allocations can now be expected, from April 5; that Army Group B requests the air delivery of small arms ammunition for the defence of a fortress, on April 5; and that an SS Corps Commander and a controller of V-type weapons are to be responsible for the protection of a limited number of key industrial installations in Thuringia, on April 5; a Naval Headlines report, which includes an item on the first reference to a Japanese Surface Suicide Attack Unit in the context of impending air attacks against Allied naval forces, suggesting that some drastic form of offensive action was intended; from the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, on the reasons for the Soviet Union selecting inappropriate delegates to the San Francisco Conference, because it is unhappy with various events involving the U.K., France, Poland and Romania, all of which were likely to cause friction between the Eastern and Western Blocs, on March 30; from the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, more on his talks with Ribbentrop who was earnest in his wish for peace with the Soviet Union, reporting no weakening in the solidarity of the German nation or risk of it betraying Japan, on March 31; and from the Japanese minister in Madrid, on the situation of the Franco Regime, which is changing for the worst, clutching at straws and attempting to curry favour with the U.S., and on Japanese attempts to encourage the Soviet Union to oppose the Spanish regime, on April 2.


German strategy, Western Front, encirclement, counter-attacks, military strength, tanks, German army, supply problems, military situation reports, military shortages, weapons production, industry, military commanders, naval intelligence, air raids, naval bases, German navy, German U-boats, shipping losses, Battle of the Atlantic, Pacific War, Japanese strategy, liberation of Burma, diplomatic intelligence, Allied powers, conferences, peace proposals, German-Soviet relations, Argentine foreign policy

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