Note 1. Our assault on Moulmein might coincide with the presence there of additional troops in transit to or from Burma. Note 2. The above reinforcements are based on the worst assumption from the Allied point of view that the Bangkok-Moulmein road and railway are completed and working. Even in that case, however, the Japanese are unlikely to be able to maintain or deploy on the main Bangkok-Moulmein Line more than three divisions in the forward area. Reinforcements over and above that number would either be used as reserves for the Bangkok-Banpong Area or as a threat to our left flank along the northern route of the Raheng-Moulmein road.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Burma China Indochina Malaya Siam Thailand United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/116/43
- Document Types
- Report Map
- File Reference
- CAB 81/116
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0116.043
- Keywords
- Contingency Planning Invasion Spanish Neutrality Operations Planning Predicting Enemy Reactions Military Strength Spanish Armed Forces German Army Military Dispositions
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Joint Planning Staff
- Pages
- 4
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence International Relations
