were still active, which would lead to the loss of the set (and operators) and might even lead to the shooting of the prisoners of war. He could think of no other action that could be taken except to send troops by air to protect the camps. THE CHAIRMAN said that messages must be sent to as many of the camps as possible saying that every step was being taken to look after their interests. He did not agree, however, to the sending of detailed instructions, as it was impossible to foresee the circumstances which might arise; and previously issued instructions might well prove to be wrong.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Germany Japan Russia Switzerland United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/92/52
- Document Types
- Summary
- File Reference
- CAB 81/92
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0092.052
- Keywords
- Topographical Intelligence Predicting Enemy Intentions Prisoners Of War Collapse Of Nazi Germany Security Surrender Release Of Information Post-war Planning Inter-services Cooperation
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Security Service
- Pages
- 5
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Inglis Edward King-Salter Guy Liddell Stewart Menzies Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Surveillance Intelligence Organization International Relations
