made in advance. At the same time, it was obviously undesirable to do anything which might be regarded by Italy as provocative. MR. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK said that from the political point of view, it was particularly necessary that we should avoid any action which, if it came to Italian ears, would cause resentment. The Italian position in Abyssinia was already difficult, and Italian opinion might be expected to be particularly sensitive on this point. If war with Italy were to break out, which was at present not considered to be probable, it might not be to our advantage to raise the tribes against Italy prematurely.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Abyssinia Italian East Africa Italy Kenya Libya
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/87/25
- Document Types
- Summary
- File Reference
- CAB 81/87
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0087.025
- Keywords
- British Intelligence Organisation Propaganda
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Middle East Intelligence Centre
- Pages
- 5
- Persons Discussed
- Andrew Barnard Frederick Beaumont-Nesbitt Victor Cavendish-Bentinck John Godfrey Stewart Menzies
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Intelligence Organization Propaganda Censorship Psychological Warfare
