(b) (c) Should this second assumption be correct, it will presumably be possible to keep the flow of oil into storage at Haifa and the actual quantities stored at Haifa down to those minimum quantities required for use by the Royal Navy and for internal consumption in Palestine. These decreased quantities will minimise the destructive effect of a bombardmnet of the oil storage area. I should, however, be grateful for confirmation of the statement that oil will NOT be exported from Haifa in time of war at all events until such time as British control in the Mediterranean is effective; it is obvious that this decision affects not only the terminals but also the defence of the pipeline.
- Collection ID
- CAB56
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Cyprus Egypt India Iran Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine Sudan Syria Transjordan Turkey
- Document Reference
- CAB 56/4/44
- Document Types
- Report
- File Reference
- CAB 56/4
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab56.0004.044
- Keywords
- Anglo-french Relations Information Sharing Defence Oil Haifa Tripoli Colonial Independence Movements Military Bases British Intelligence Organisation Intelligence Gathering Communications Liaison Security Aircraft Combined Operations Inter-services Cooperation Military Situation Reports British Army French Army Colonial Troops Border Controls Camouflage Civilians Suez Canal Press Reports
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Committee of Imperial Defence Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 20
- Persons Discussed
- Arthur Cornwall-Jones Robert Haining
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- International Relations Military Intelligence
