TOP SECRET MAJOR-GENERAL STRONG, referring to the necessity for including a "Q" Officer in the team, said that with regard to the assessment of Soviet logistic problems, it might be worth while to consider the desirability of establishing the officer responsible for this work in an intelligence branch or in the intelligence organisation. Very little information was available about Soviet methods of moving forces but it seemed that they were considerably different from our own. He thought, therefore, that unless the person responsible for assessing enemy logistic problems worked in the intelligence atmosphere, there was a tendency to incline too much towards own own rates of movement as a basis for calculations when dealing with Soviet logistic problems.
- Collection ID
- CAB159
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Greece Korea Soviet Union United Kingdom United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 159/8/14
- Document Types
- Summary
- File Reference
- CAB 159/8
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab159.0008.014
- Keywords
- Anglo-american Relations British Intelligence Organisation American Intelligence Services Information Sharing Intelligence Channels Personnel Diplomacy Allies Alliances Military Intelligence Intelligence Requirements Atomic Energy Military Operations Soviet Foreign Policy Assessing Enemy Strength Predicting Enemy Intentions Threat Of War With The Ussr Intelligence Services Responsibilities Intelligence Distribution
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- British Joint Services Mission Chiefs of Staff Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Bureau Joint Intelligence Committee (Washington) Joint Intelligence Staff Joint Planning Staff Ministry of Defence Permanent Under-Secretary's Department Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 5
- Persons Discussed
- Valentine Boucher John Gardiner Patrick Reilly Arthur Shortt Kenneth Strong
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Intelligence Organization Surveillance
