Minutes of the Twenty-eighth Meeting of the Committee, Held in Conference Room "G", at the Ministry of Defence, S.W.I, on Friday, 10th March, 1950 at 10.45 a.m.

TOP SECRET be an important factor tending to make more probable a Soviet decision to start a preventive war. The Foreign Office had attached considerable importance to the second sentence of that conclusion but it had not been accepted by all the members of the Committee. The Foreign Office view was that, having twice experienced the results of aggression by Germany, the Russians would be particularly sensitive to the presence of a German Army on her Western frontier. AIR COMMODORE COUSINS said that, looked at from the Russian point of view, the biggest prize in the 'cold war' would be a united Germany under Soviet control, ostensibly unoccupied by the foreign powers and entirely lost to the West. Thus, if any other Power showed an intention to achieve a united Germany not under Soviet domination, they would be resisted strongly by the Russians. It was therefore, he suggested, not possible for the Western Allies to build up the strength of Germany without Provoking a major war. He was therefore in general agreement with the present conclusion (e). BRIGADIER COLE said that in their report+ on Allied defence policy and strategy, the Directors of Plans had specifically stated that in their view a strong France was the key to the defence of Western Europe. French morale was, however, at present low and it might be suggested that to build the defence of Western Europe on France was to build on sand and that the key to the defence of Western Europe was in fact a strong Western Germany. To achieve a strong Western Germany, however, the French must be persuaded to accept her re-armament and France would not accept this without herself being strong. Whichever thesis was correct the goal remained of swinging the French away from Communism and building up their military strength. Until this had been achieved no long term aim of a strong Germany being a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation could be considered. REAR-ADMIRAL LONGLEY-COOK pointed out that the morale and efficiency of the French Navy had greatly improved, and it was significant that this improvement had obtained following substantial help from this country. In his personal opinion French national and military morale would only be strengthened from tangible evidence of the intention of the other Allies to meet Franc's defence requirements and that if this were provided France could be the key to the defence of Western Europe. CAPTAIN WATSON pointed out that military measures for the assistance of France could not be considered on their own and must be linked with financial and political considerations. MAJOR GENERAL SHORTT pointed out the danger in constant reference to a strong France of assuming that she was in fact strong. Current reports on the French Army were most depressing. It was important that the Chiefs of Staff should be kept informed of the state of French morale. After further discussion, it was generally agreed that the second sentence of conclusion (e) should be reworded to read:- "For example, evidence that the Western Allies had decided to re-arm Western Germany on a substantial scale might conceivably provoke a Soviet decision to start a preventive war." + J.P. (49) 172 (Final). -2-