Minutes of the Twenty-second Meeting of the Committee, Held in Conference Room "G" at the Ministry of Defence, S.W.I, on Friday, 24th February, 1950 at 10.45 a.m.

TOP SECRET Likelihood of War There was general agreement with the statement in paragraph 6 of the Annex on the possible circumstances in which war might break out, and, subject to the following, with the relevant conclusions in the report. It was suggested that the last sentence of conclusion (c), that circumstances compelling the Western Powers to go to war to protect their vital interests provided the only way that war might break out, was too categorical as excluding the possibility of a preventive war by the Soviet Union, despite indications of that possibility in the Committee's report on Soviet Use of Atomic BombsØ. A preventive war by the Western Powers was out of the question. If the Western Powers became economically and politically sound and stable and maintained a reasonable facade of military strength, it might be most strongly held that the Soviet Leaders would not declare war. There was complete agreement that war was most likely to occur through the circumstances stated in the report, but as there was not unanimity that this was the only way, the general view of the Committee should be that, if the Soviet Leaders became convinced that the Western Allies intended to attack the Soviet Union, the possibility that they might strike first could not be ruled out. The last sentence of Conclusion (c) should therefore be omitted. The possibility was considered that the Soviet Leaders might never go to war since they might never need to to further their interests. Such a possibility implied the establishment of Communism throughout the whole World. The establishment of Communism throughout even Europe might precipitate war, and World wide Communist control without war was so unlikely, at any rate in the period under review, that it was agreed that this point did not require special mention. In the view of the Foreign Office, an important factor affecting a decision of the Soviet Leaders to go to war would be evidence that the Western Allies were rearming Germany on a significant scale. This point should be brought out in the report. Following a query on paragraph 15 of the Annex regarding the liability of the Satellites to the Soviet Union, it was agreed that that paragraph should be re-examined by the Foreign Office. Treatment of the date There was general agreement that the arguments concerning the date when the Soviet Leaders might be prepared to risk a major war, in support of the conclusion thereon were inadequately presented, and did not discuss fully enough the grounds on which the present date for planning was decided and the factors now causing those grounds to be altered. A separate part of the report should be devoted to this matter. It was suggested that the date "1955/56" in conclusion (d) of the report was not sufficiently precise, and that the factors in the report led to the view that the date before which it was considered unlikely that the Soviet Leaders would be prepared to risk a major war, should be stated as 1st January 1955. As regards economic factors, however, such precision was impossible, since Soviet Five Year Plans were subject to completion by as much as, say, six months either side of the planned date, nor could the effect on such plans of economic cold war against Russia be estimated. + J.I.C. (50) 7 (Revised Draft). Ø J.I.C. (49) 111 (Final), Conclusion (b). -2-