(g) It is important that key components for Service equipment should be kept under security control from the earliest possible stage, and knowledge of them denied to foreign countries where practicable and necessary, even after the whole unit has become obsolete. (h) The desire to stimulate British exports is tending to outweigh security risks. These risks under present day conditions are considerable, and present Departments and the Security Service with a formidable problem to which there is no easy or watertight solution.
- Collection ID
- CAB158
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Germany Russia Soviet Union
- Document Reference
- CAB 158/1/15
- Document Types
- Report Memorandum
- File Reference
- CAB 158/1
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab158.0001.015
- Keywords
- Soviet Agents Industrial Intelligence Secret Weapons Trade Technology Espionage Counter-intelligence Anglo-soviet Relations Diplomatic Officials Communism
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Ministry of Defence Security Service
- Pages
- 9
- Persons Discussed
- William Hayter Edward Parry Lawrence Pendred Gerald Templer
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- British Domestic Security Weapons Technology Nuclear Warfare Intelligence Operations
