Government Code and Cypher School: Signals Intelligence Passed to the Prime Minister, Messages and Correspondence

A file of signals intelligence reports, messages, and correspondence issued by the Government Code and Cypher School and sent by the head ('C') of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. This file includes the following reports: BONIFACE summaries for the Deputy Prime Minister (PM), Brigadier Jacob and Mr Loxley; on the EUREKA conference and three items from the SUNSET summary for November 27; on Southern Europe: that on November 25 the Germans on Leros considered it absolutely necessary, for reasons of health and security, to transport prisoners away immediately; that the Germans decided on November 25 that all possible use was to be made of Turkish territorial waters for the removal of prisoners from Rhodes to Leros, probably in association with a move of Italian prisoners to the Greek mainland; that on 23 November, the German authorities at the ports of Savona, San Remo and Imperia were making contingency plans for abandoning them and making preparations for demolition and blocking; of the Germans preparing for Operation DELPHIN, the capture of 6 islands in the Adriatic, following the build-up of the required forces in the port of Split, from November 25-December 3; of a German cargo ship being sunk off Samos, on November 27; that Junkers takes over the Italian Monfalcone aircraft factory, north-west of Trieste, by November 25; of German speculation on future Allied plans for Italy and the Mediterranean area, including more Allied emphasis on the Italian Front and evidence for an Allied strategic reserve in the areas of Tunis and Sicily; more details of an Allied air raid on Toulon, on November 24; that the Allied submarine and air threat forces the Germans to abandon the Rhodes/Scarpanto/Crete sea route, and that Turkish territorial waters should be used where possible for the transfer of prisoners from Rhodes to Leros, on November 25; and Naval Headlines, including 5 items from U-boat communications, including an instruction from Berlin on November 26 that because of heavy British pressure on Spain there was now a much greater risk of U-boats being interned by Spanish authorities, so U-boat captains were to make the pretexts for their internment by Spanish authorities as difficult as possible.