Government Code and Cypher School: Signals Intelligence Passed to the Prime Minister, Messages and Correspondence

A file of signals intelligence reports, messages, and correspondence issued by the Government Code and Cypher School and sent by the head ('C') of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. This file includes the following reports on the Russian Front: a minute from the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS) replying to the Prime Minister's (PM's) query on 3150 in which he requested the actual strength in divisions of the Russian Corps' formations - estimates are given but the VCIGS points out that the Russians had not released any details of their own order of battle to the U.K.; the PM annotes this minute as TRIDENT and asks to speak to C about it; on North Africa: that preparations for the destruction of the port facilities at Bizerta were completed by April 28, with final arrangements being made to carry out the plan on departure, on May 1; that a tug is to tow a damaged destroyer to Sicily after completing the blocking of Bizerta harbour, on the night of May 1/2; that the decision to close Bizerta to shipping is to be suspended for as long as possible, on May 2; of a manning crisis in a German Air Force (GAF) fighter unit, on April 27, with 900 men having been taken and only 400 replaced; from the GAF air attaché in Bucharest, a report from GAF HQ in Berlin on an RAF raid on Essen on the night of April 30; and a status report on GAF operations on the Russian Front; Naval Headlines; from the Italian consul in Tetuan, describing talks with the Spanish military attaché in Algeria, on the build up of Allied landing materials in Algeria and Allied plans to carry out simultaneous landings in France and Sicily in May or June, none of which met the complete approval of General Giraud, on April 29; from the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, on very lengthy instructions from Tokyo to the ambassador, on April 28, giving the war situation as seen from Japan, criticism of German strategy, in particular of underestimating Soviet strength, and that the ambassador is to present the Japanese assessment to Hitler; the PM asks C to ensure that the U.S. President received copies and adds that he will take them as TRIDENT; from the Portguese minister in Ankara, that General Wilson's HQ has moved to Beirut, suggesting future Allied action against Greek and Italian islands in the Aegean Sea while the Germans concentrate on the Balkans; that Germany has lost the war but is attempting to prolong it to obtain a compromise solution; and that Communist infiltration throughout the Near and Middle East is increasing, on April 29; from the Turkish ambassador in Tokyo, a report of April 27, quoting an extremely confidential report from a reliable source, on recent talks between Hitler and the Japanese ambassador to Berlin during the Hitler/Mussolini meetings at Salsburg on April 7-11, which the Japanese ambassador stated that Bastianini, Ribbentrop, Goering, Keitel, Donitz, Zeitzler and Himmler also attended - in which Hitler requests Japan to attack the Soviet Union as Germany had lost the campaign in North Africa and the Soviet Union had rejected German peace proposals in 1942; from the Turkish ambassador in Rome, on a request from Ankara to the ambassador on April 22 asking for views on the appointment of the German Weizsacker to the Vatican and would Weizsacker aid the Pope in attempts at brokering a peace agreement; and the ambassador replied to Ankara a week later, stressing that the Germans were desperate to prevent the Italians from making a separate peace with the Allies and that Weizsacker might be there to influence their decision.