DR. NOTON said that he was in favour of using C.I.O.S., because:(i) C.I.O.S. had the experience. (ii) A proportion of the second and third priority Black List targets, which they had drawn up, would go on to the Grey list. (iii) Considerable time had been required to set up C.I.O.S. (iv) C.I.O.S. represented technical interests on the American side. If C.I.O.S. was not used there should, at least, be a Joint Secretariat so that advantage could be taken of the experience gained. PROFESSOR LINSTEAD agreed that it was important to make use of any experience gained; he was in favour of the proposal to have a Joint Secretariat which would make that experience available without overloading C.I.O.S.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Germany Italy
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/147/7
- Document Types
- Summary
- File Reference
- CAB 81/147
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0147.007
- Keywords
- British Intelligence Organisation Intelligence Priorities Technology Intelligence Requirements Intelligence Gathering Anglo-american Relations Intelligence Services Responsibilities
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Ministry of Economic Warfare
- Pages
- 5
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Edward King-Salter
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Intelligence Organization
