(a) The attitude of the Swedish population, which will have an effect upon the availability of skilled labour. (b) The extent to which the Swedes may have succeeded in destroying facilities at the ports. (c) The extent to which the Germans would be prepared to use small ships, uneconomically loaded, in order to make the maximum use of the available quays. We have, however, considered in detail, so far as is possible, the capacity of the ports which Germany would be most likely to use, and we are of the opinion that the figures given in paragraphs 14 to 20 below, are as close an estimate as can be obtained in these circumstances.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- France Germany Sweden
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/135/6
- Document Types
- Memorandum
- File Reference
- CAB 81/135
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0135.006
- Keywords
- Predicting Enemy Intentions German Strategy Military Strength Swedish Neutrality Shipping Coastal Defence Railways Landing Places Aerial Attacks German Airborne Troops
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 8
- Persons Discussed
- Frederick Beaumont-Nesbitt Victor Cavendish-Bentinck John Godfrey
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence Intelligence Organization
