Premium

20.500.12592/kthtjv

Timing for Post-Dracula Operations. Note by Sec.

1 Aug 1944

(c) By D plus 2 the majority of the aircraft referred to in paragraph 4 could be moved to within a radius of 300 miles of the assault. Even then, however, the effort would probably not exceed 25 Bomber/Fighter Bomber sorties per 24 hours. 6. In view of the continuance of operation CAPITAL and the increasing probability of a major Allied assault elsewhere in the area, the Japanese would probably not commit the rest of their small and wasting air force in this region. Land Forces 7. The following is our estimate, which must of necessity be speculative, of Japanese dispositions in September, 1945:Victoria Point one Inf.
china malaya indochina burma siam second world war military intelligence airfields joint intelligence staff joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff denis capel-dunn intelligence requirements edward king-salter operations planning photographic reconnaissance assessing enemy strength pacific war predicting enemy reactions
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
Burma China Indochina Malaya Siam
Document Reference
CAB 81/125/72
Document Types
Memorandum
File Reference
CAB 81/125
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0125.072
Keywords
Predicting Enemy Reactions Assessing Enemy Strength Pacific War Airfields Operations Planning Intelligence Requirements Photographic Reconnaissance
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Joint Intelligence Staff
Pages
5
Persons Discussed
Denis Capel-Dunn Edward King-Salter
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. August - October 1944. Papers Numbers. JIC 376-450. Volume XXXV
Themes
Military Intelligence

Related Topics

All