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Occupation of North Borneo Report by J.I.C.

1 Apr 1944

AIR FORCES 14. Although the estimates given below have been based on two alternatives, one of which is that Russia. has entered the war, it is impossible to estimate and so take into account the effect of heavy losses which might, as a result, have been incurred by the Japanese if Russia's entry into the war had preceded by an appreciable time the dates of the attack on North Borneo dealt with below. If these losses had in fact been heavy, the Japanese might have been compelled so fundamentally to alter their strategy as to withdraw all their air forces to the Inner Zone from the Burma-Malaya-Siam-South Indo-China-East Indies area.
philippines singapore china japan russia malaya indochina burma siam second world war contingency planning formosa military intelligence joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff victor cavendish-bentinck john sinclair francis inglis geoffrey vickers assessing enemy strength japanese navy pacific war allied strategy japanese army japanese strategy japanese air force predicting enemy reactions
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
Burma China Formosa Indochina Japan Malaya Philippines Russia Siam Singapore
Document Reference
CAB 81/122/17
Document Types
Report
File Reference
CAB 81/122
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0122.017
Keywords
Pacific War Predicting Enemy Reactions Japanese Strategy Assessing Enemy Strength Japanese Army Japanese Navy Japanese Air Force Contingency Planning Allied Strategy
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
Pages
4
Persons Discussed
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Inglis John Sinclair Geoffrey Vickers
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. April - May 1944. Papers Numbers. JIC 151-225. Volume XXXII
Themes
Military Intelligence

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