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20.500.12592/6n5tc7

Scale of Enemy Resistance North of Rome Note by J.I.C.(A.F.) 8/44. Note by Sec.

1 Feb 1944

APPENDIX "A" TO J.I.C. (F)/8/44 18th March, 1944 J.I.C. (AF) NOTE TO J.P.S. ON SCALE OF ENEMY RESISTANCE NORTH OF ROME ADVANTAGES OF CAUSING MAXIMUM DELAY TO ALLIED ADVANCE 1. We consider that the Germans are likely to delay the Allies to the maximum of their capabilities for the following reasons: (a) While there is every indication that the enemy intends to make a determined stand on the RIMINI-PISA line, he must as a military principle do all he can to delay an assault on his main defences by holding intermediate positions for as long as possible.
italy second world war contingency planning defence military intelligence joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff edward king-salter kenneth strong german strategy assessing enemy strength invasion of italy
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
Italy
Document Reference
CAB 81/121/52
Document Types
Memorandum
File Reference
CAB 81/121
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0121.052
Keywords
Invasion Of Italy Assessing Enemy Strength Defence Contingency Planning German Strategy
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
Pages
4
Persons Discussed
Edward King-Salter Kenneth Strong
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. February - April 1944. Papers Numbers. JIC 71-150. Volume XXXI
Themes
Military Intelligence

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