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Scale of Japanese Opposition to Certain Operations in Spring 1945. Note by the Secretary. Reply to F.P.S.

1 Jan 1944

7. The following estimates are largely conjectural and subject to revision in the light of any later information which may become available concerning Japanese intentions and movement of forces. FORMOSA 8. (a) Naval Forces The Japanese navybeing disposed across the flank of the Allied assault convoys, would be in a strong position to attack them. In view of the paramount importance of Formosa as appreciated in paragraph 3 above, the Japanese navy would probably risk battle unless it had been severely mauled in earlier operations.
philippines india china japan russia malaya indochina burma netherlands siam second world war formosa military intelligence military dispositions joint intelligence staff joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff edward king-salter operations planning assessing enemy strength japanese navy pacific war japanese army japanese air force predicting enemy reactions
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
Burma China Formosa India Indochina Japan Malaya Netherlands Philippines Russia Siam
Document Reference
CAB 81/120/54
Document Types
Memorandum
File Reference
CAB 81/120
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0120.054
Keywords
Predicting Enemy Reactions Pacific War Operations Planning Assessing Enemy Strength Japanese Army Japanese Air Force Japanese Navy Military Dispositions
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Joint Intelligence Staff
Pages
6
Persons Discussed
Edward King-Salter
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. January - February 1944. Papers Numbers. JIC 1-70. Volume XXX
Themes
Military Intelligence

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