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20.500.12592/5z34v8

Aircraft Carrier Operations in the Indian Ocean. Report by J.I.C.

1 Jan 1944

4. Lastly, to the extent that the air striking forces caused actual wastage to the Japanese air forces in the Burma-Malaya-N.E.I. Zone, the flow of replacement aircraft to other theatres might be reduced, but this factor would be so small as to e almost negligible. 5. To sum up, we do not believe that the presence of carrier-borne air striking forces in the N.E.I.Malaya area would materially affect Japanese air opposition to the scheduled Pacific operations. It might pin down one or two specialist anti-shipping units and, to the extent to which wastage was actually inflicted, slightly affect the flow of replacement aircraft.
malaya burma warships second world war military intelligence naval operations joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff victor cavendish-bentinck edmund rushbrooke geoffrey vickers francis davidson allied strategy predicting enemy reactions
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
Burma Malaya
Document Reference
CAB 81/120/43
Document Types
Report
File Reference
CAB 81/120
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0120.043
Keywords
Warships Naval Operations Allied Strategy Predicting Enemy Reactions
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
Pages
2
Persons Discussed
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. January - February 1944. Papers Numbers. JIC 1-70. Volume XXX
Themes
Military Intelligence

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