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20.500.12592/z15fc7

Japanese Naval, Army and Air Strengths. Note by Secretary

1 Nov 1943

remain the one area from which serious land threat to Inner Zone can materialise at short notice. We think, therefore, that Japan would be most reluctant to move any divisions from Manchuria and would in any case not move more than two. (c) Agree Japs will retain 8 Divisions in Japan proper but do not think they will appreciate any threat in near future. (d) Loss of Philippines would seriously hamper but not cut sea communications. Agree, however, that in this eventuality, Japan would suffer considerable losses if she attempted to withdraw, by sea, troops in Western perimeter.
philippines singapore india china marshall islands japan guinea germany russia malaya indochina shipping burma ceylon siam great britain korea second world war formosa military intelligence military dispositions joint intelligence staff joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff foreign office stewart menzies edward king-salter assessing enemy strength japanese navy japanese army japanese strategy japanese air force
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
Burma Ceylon China Formosa Germany Great Britain Guinea India Indochina Japan Korea Malaya Marshall Islands Philippines Russia Siam Singapore
Document Reference
CAB 81/119/38
Document Types
Memorandum Correspondence
File Reference
CAB 81/119
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0119.038
Keywords
Assessing Enemy Strength Japanese Army Japanese Navy Japanese Air Force Japanese Strategy Military Dispositions Shipping
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Joint Intelligence Staff
Pages
19
Persons Discussed
Edward King-Salter Stewart Menzies
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. November - December 1943. Papers Numbers. JIC 471-531. Volume XXIX
Themes
Military Intelligence

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