to have increased this garrison by more than one infantry battalion by the Spring of 1944. They would probably be unwilling to lock up greater forces than this in an island. which might not in fact be the objective of the Allied attack. It may be assumed that coastal defences will have been considerably elaborated by the Spring of 1944 with a corresponding increase in coast defence personnel. Appendix A gives some details of their present extent. (ii) Air Opposition. The opposition during the initial stage of the assault would be limited to the 80/100 aircraft in the Andamans and Nicobars.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Burma Ceylon China Indochina Malaya Siam Singapore
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/119/24
- Document Types
- Report
- File Reference
- CAB 81/119
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0119.024
- Keywords
- Operations Planning Pacific War Military Operations Liberation Of Burma Japanese Navy Naval Strength Predicting Enemy Reactions Fortifications Intelligence Reports
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 5
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
