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20.500.12592/xb2rv5

"Crossbow". First Report by J.I.C.

1 Nov 1943

as to their function: nevertheless, it is felt that the very real urgency for attack is not of such a nature as to preclude the drawing up of a careful plan for bombing countermeasures, in order to avoid early diversion of a large scale bombing effort on many targets which are not yet "rips", or which are otherwise unsuitable for attack. The most careful planning is also needed to work out the best methods of bombing attack on these targets. CONCLUSION ON ROCKET THREAT 11. Taking what is considered the most reasonable View of the present information at our disposal, and using the constructional activities in France as a guide, it is thought that the threatened operation against the United Kingdom by long range rocket, as at present apparently planned, could not be mounted until February, even without serious disruption by bombing countermeasures.
united kingdom technology france germany nuclear warfare second world war missiles weapons development military intelligence intelligence gathering joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff weapons technology victor cavendish-bentinck francis inglis edmund rushbrooke geoffrey vickers secret weapons francis davidson
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
France Germany United Kingdom
Document Reference
CAB 81/119/15
Document Types
Report
File Reference
CAB 81/119
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0119.015
Keywords
Secret Weapons Missiles Intelligence Gathering Weapons Development Technology
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
Pages
7
Persons Discussed
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. November - December 1943. Papers Numbers. JIC 471-531. Volume XXIX
Themes
Weapons Technology Nuclear Warfare Military Intelligence

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