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Braddock II. Report by J.I.C.

1 Oct 1943

land successes. A crisis of this nature would impose such an added strain on the security forces that their control of the whole internal situation would probably be rendered precarious. It is possible that the launching of "Braddock II" at this juncture, when it would be used most extensively by both Germans and foreign workers, would just tip the scale and help to break the grip of the security forces decisively. CONCLUSION 5. In our opinion, therefore, operation "Braddock II" should not be launched now, when the security forces in Germany are probably sufficient to prevent the widespread use of "Braddocks" and when failure might vitiate the prospects of this weapon being used successfully later.
germany second world war special operations joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff intelligence operations geheime staatspolizei victor cavendish-bentinck francis inglis edmund rushbrooke geoffrey vickers anti-nazi resistance francis davidson german morale
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
Germany
Document Reference
CAB 81/118/33
Document Types
Report
File Reference
CAB 81/118
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0118.033
Keywords
Special Operations Anti-nazi Resistance German Morale
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Geheime Staatspolizei Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
Pages
2
Persons Discussed
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. October - November 1943. Papers Numbers. JIC 411-470. Volume XXVIII
Themes
Intelligence Operations

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