At least 1 regiment (a) D day D D + 14 1 Div. (b) D + 14 D + 28 2 Divs. D + 4 weeks D + 3 Divs. 8 weeks By D + 8 weeks there could, however, be two further divisions in the Bangkok area. The rate of reinforcement given above makes no allowance for any allied air interference with Japanese road and railway communications. (b) Naval Forces. Since by the Spring of 1944 the United States, irrespective of her Atlantic commitments, will have a considerable naval superiority in the Pacific the Japanese are extremely unlikely to reinforce their surface forces to interfere with allied landings.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Burma China Indochina Malaya Siam United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/117/23
- Document Types
- Report
- File Reference
- CAB 81/117
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0117.023
- Keywords
- Operations Planning Pacific War Contingency Planning Assessing Enemy Strength Predicting Enemy Reactions
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 3
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
