above, could not be offered to Russia without landing us in difficulties with China who would certainly be supported by the United States. Probably the furthest we could go would be to say that at the conference table we would not oppose Russia's claims to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Unless, however, we are already in occupation of these territories, Russia will calculate that, as Britain and America must in their own interests defeat Japan, she can afford to wait because her geographical position will enable her to reap the benefit, even if she postpones entry into the war until the last moment.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- China Germany Great Britain Japan Korea Mongolia Russia United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/115/55
- Document Types
- Report
- File Reference
- CAB 81/115
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0115.055
- Keywords
- Soviet Foreign Policy Predicting Enemy Intentions Allies Foreign Policy Military Operations Manpower Military Dispositions Red Army Japanese Army Collapse Of Nazi Germany Contingency Planning Post-war Planning Soviet Government Allied Strategy Japanese Strategy Soviet-chinese Relations Invasion Threat Territorial Concessions
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 3
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence International Relations
