Paragraph 5 We think that the Germans while devoting their main effort to Russia will attempt, in the South, to hold the island line, Corsica Sardinia Sicily Crete Dodecanese, as defensive outposts to the "fortress of Europe" and, in the west, hold the coast with, if necessary, reduced garrisons. Paragraph 6 (a) The statement that the commitments of the United nations in North Africa permitted the transfer of divisions from France to Russia seems an over simplification. The Germans were forced to transfer troops to Russia in order to meet the threat of disaster there; they would in any case probably have had to take some risk in the West and were the more able to do so because the season was unfavourable for cross-Channel operations and because they had seen the main effort of the United Nations directed to North Africa.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Bulgaria Corsica Crete France Greece Hungary Italy Romania Russia Sardinia Serbia Sicily Spain Tunisia Turkey Yugoslavia
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/115/6
- Document Types
- Memorandum
- File Reference
- CAB 81/115
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0115.006
- Keywords
- Military Operations Military Intelligence American Intelligence Services Anglo-american Relations Invasion Threat Spanish Neutrality Predicting Enemy Intentions Assessing Enemy Strength Geographic Intelligence Military Dispositions German Army Troop Movements Axis Powers Allies Bulgarian Armed Forces Communications Hungarian Armed Forces Occupation Arrangements Shipping
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee United Nations
- Pages
- 6
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
