3 for Spain. We are led, therefore, to the belief that the Russian armies are capable in 1943 of containing the whole of the German army arrayed against them and that the Germans could. not find the necessary divisions for Spain without risking disaster on the Russian front. 7. It has, however, been suggested. that if the Germans withdraw to the shorter line, Riga (or Lake Peipus) -River Dnieper-Sea of Azov, they could perhaps save some 20 divisions. We believe that this argument is fallacious. It is based on the assumption that if it takes X divisions to hold a Front of the present length, it only takes X-Y divisions to hold a shorter Front.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Austria Balearic Islands Czechoslovakia Denmark Finland France Germany Gibraltar Great Britain Greece Hungary Italy Morocco Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia Sardinia Sicily Spain Tunisia United Kingdom United States of America Yugoslavia
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/114/51
- Document Types
- Memorandum
- File Reference
- CAB 81/114
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0114.051
- Keywords
- German Strategy German Foreign Policy Spanish Neutrality
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee United Nations
- Pages
- 21
- Persons Discussed
- Denis Capel-Dunn Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Francisco Franco Hermann Göring Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- International Relations Military Intelligence
