(b) Air. Japanese air opposition and scale of effort against a landing in the Penang area might be expected to be similair to that set out under question 2(b). Question 4. What strategic air and land reserves could be brought against (a) Northern Sumatra, (b) Penang area. How soon after the initial assault on Northern Sumatra could they arrive in either area? Answer. (a) Land Forces. A strategic reserve of ten to twelve divisions is the maximum that could be drawn upon for reinforcement of both Northern Sumatra and Penang area.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Burma Japan Malaya Siam Singapore
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/114/22
- Document Types
- Memorandum Correspondence
- File Reference
- CAB 81/114
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0114.022
- Keywords
- Operations Planning Pacific War Intelligence Gathering Japanese Army Japanese Air Force Military Dispositions
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Joint Intelligence Staff
- Pages
- 3
- Persons Discussed
- Denis Capel-Dunn
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
