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20.500.12592/c9321r

Future Action by the German Surface Fleet. Report

1 Jan 1943

strong air cover, but may be compelled to reintroduce such attacks in an all-out effort to prevent large scale offensive operations from being carried out. Attacks by surface forces on such convoys are less likely, since Germany would consider the risks involved to her ships to be unacceptable except in the mid-Atlantic in the area outside the range of shore-based aircraft. At the same time, as soon as military convoys are known to be assembling in large numbers, Doenitz will appreciate that a sortie by even one heavy ship might considerably dislocate our plans for Naval escorts and covering forces.
singapore france iceland germany norway second world war military intelligence adolf hitler battle of the atlantic joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff nazi leadership victor cavendish-bentinck francis inglis geoffrey vickers german u-boats predicting enemy intentions german navy francis davidson german strategy karl dönitz
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
France Germany Iceland Norway Singapore
Document Reference
CAB 81/113/65
Document Types
Report
File Reference
CAB 81/113
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0113.065
Keywords
Predicting Enemy Intentions Nazi Leadership German Navy Battle Of The Atlantic German Strategy German U-boats
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
Pages
4
Persons Discussed
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson Karl Dönitz Adolf Hitler Francis Inglis Geoffrey Vickers
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. January - March 1943. Papers Numbers. JIC 1-100. Volume XXIII
Themes
Military Intelligence

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