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20.500.12592/13ff57

Japanese Shipping. Note by Secretary

1 Jan 1943

5. The situation clearly points to an enforced reduction in Japanese mobility from the Spring of 1943 onwards. This implies that the Japanese might have to change over to a strictly defensive policy, and endeavour to set up a defensive line held mainly by shore-based aircraft and naval forces operating under this cover, with which to inflict as much loss as possible on Allied attacking forces. The adoption of such a system would enable the Japanese to reduce the pool of shipping, held purely for military movements, to the level necessary for the quick movement of local reserves.
japan shipping oil second world war formosa military intelligence joint intelligence sub-committee chiefs of staff victor cavendish-bentinck francis inglis edmund rushbrooke geoffrey vickers japanese navy pacific war shipping losses supply problems
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Countries
Formosa Japan
Document Reference
CAB 81/113/6
Document Types
Report
File Reference
CAB 81/113
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0113.006
Keywords
Pacific War Shipping Japanese Navy Shipping Losses Oil Supply Problems
Languages
English
Organizations
Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
Pages
4
Persons Discussed
Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Inglis Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Memoranda. January - March 1943. Papers Numbers. JIC 1-100. Volume XXIII
Themes
Military Intelligence

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