4. Although German strategy in North Africa is directed primarily towards holding a defensive bridgehead in Tunisia, the Germans may carry out local offensives to improve and give depth to this bridgehead. They will conduct an offensive defence which will aim at interfering with Allied concentrations, and will exploit any opportunity for vigorous action which offers, despite difficulties of weather and terrain, shortage of transport and PORT CAPACITIES IN NORTH AFRICA maintenance problems. 5. A dominant factor governing the period during which the Germans can hold their bridgehead in North Africa is their ability to reinforce and maintain their forces there.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Algeria Crete Egypt France Italy Libya Malta Sardinia Sicily Tunisia
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/113/5
- Document Types
- Report Memorandum Map
- File Reference
- CAB 81/113
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0113.005
- Keywords
- Desert War Axis Strategy Predicting Enemy Intentions Military Dispositions Ports Supply Problems Shipping Losses Military Strength German Army Manpower British Army United States Army Aircraft German Air Force Topographical Intelligence Military Supplies German Withdrawal Defence Fortifications Geographic Intelligence
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 19
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Thomas Haddon Francis Inglis Erwin Rommel Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
