which must precede the exploitation of Russia. In those circumstances, even after allowing for the relief to be derived from a reduction in the demand for most sorts of armament production, we do not believe that Germany can do more in 1943 than to arrest the decline in her economic capacity. We therefore maintain the view expressed in J.I.C.(42) 201(0). 7. The food situation could not be improved before the 1945 harvest. It is doubtful whether sufficient labour could be released in time to enable the 1943 harvest in Germany and Garman occupied Europe to be better than that in 1942 (weather conditions apart).
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Germany Great Britain Kazakhstan Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/110/8
- Document Types
- Memorandum Report
- File Reference
- CAB 81/110
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0110.008
- Keywords
- Economy German War Effort Economic Intelligence Soviet Government Eastern Front Contingency Planning German War Aims German Strategy Invasion Of The Soviet Union Manpower Agriculture Food Supplies Industry War Materials Railways Oil Resources
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 4
- Persons Discussed
- Denis Capel-Dunn
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
