A N N E X. 1. The disposition of our air and naval forces is such as to make an invasion of Ireland as an isolated operation so difficult as to be most unlikely to be attempted. Further, unless our forces in Great Britain were engaged simultaneously or immediately afterwards, they could at their leisure deal with the German forces largely isolated in Ireland through difficulty of maintaining sea supply routes. If attempted at all, it is likely only as a subsidiary or diversionary operation during an attempted invasion of Great Britain.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- England France Germany Gibraltar Great Britain Ireland Northern Ireland Norway
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/106/37
- Document Types
- Report
- File Reference
- CAB 81/106
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0106.037
- Keywords
- Predicting Enemy Intentions Invasion Threat German Strategy Amphibious Operations Military Strength German Airborne Troops Assessing Enemy Strength German Army Tanks Ports
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 11
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson John Godfrey Charles Medhurst Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
