(b) The Port Sudan Route. The Port Sudan route could not be used by the enemy until the Suez Canal had been re-opened to general traffic. Then Port Sudan would have to be captured. Sufficient forces could not be brought down the Nile route both to capture Port Sudan from the land and to hold our forces off in the Central Sudan. The capture would therefore have to be done by a landing from the sea a most difficult operation in the face of resistance by us and of the scale of air and naval attack which we should be able to launch from Eritrea and the southern Red Sea ports.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Abyssinia Egypt Eritrea Iraq Libya Palestine Sudan Syria Transjordan Yemen
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/103/34
- Document Types
- Memorandum
- File Reference
- CAB 81/103
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0103.034
- Keywords
- Contingency Planning German Strategy Predicting Enemy Intentions Invasion Threat
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Joint Planning Staff
- Pages
- 12
- Persons Discussed
- Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Francis Davidson John Godfrey Charles Medhurst Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
