(a) From the Tunis Bizerta area, these ports having been previously captured by airborne troops. (b) By forces based on Tripoli. (c) By forces moving through Spain and Spanish Morocoo on Morocco and Algeria. 5. The maximum scales of attack in each case are given in Appendices A to C of Annex A. 6. On examination, we find that both (a) and (b) above involve considerable difficulties in execution. In the case of (a) it would be incumbent on the Axis Powers first to seize by air all the Tunisian ports simultaneously in order to deny their use to the British Fleet.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Algeria Austria Balearic Islands Crete Egypt France Germany Gibraltar Greece Italy Libya Malta Morocco Portugal Sardinia Senegal Sicily Spain Syria Tunisia Turkey United Kingdom United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/98/190
- Document Types
- Report
- File Reference
- CAB 81/98
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0098.190
- Keywords
- Vichy Regime Colonies French Politics Axis Strategy French Armed Forces Defence Contingency Planning Predicting Enemy Intentions Free French Invasion Spanish Neutrality Military Organisation German Army German Air Force Shipping Aircraft Transportation Italian Army Economic Intelligence Fuel
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 18
- Persons Discussed
- Frederick Beaumont-Nesbitt Victor Cavendish-Bentinck C Edwards John Godfrey
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- International Relations Military Intelligence
