allegiance to D.C.O.S. .. MR. CRESWELL said that logically the work of B.I.O.S. was no longer an intelligence responsibility, but felt that a changeover at this moment would cause serious delay.THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL said that intelligence was still involved, and he felt that the Sub-Committee should not give up its responsibility for the present. He realised that the degree to which intelligence was involved varied with each Ministry. THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE proposed certain detailed amendments which were agreed; in particular, an amendment to the effect that each Service Ministry or Member Agency should find a quota of the personnel required for the Secretariat.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Azores Belgium Canada Canary Islands Germany Iceland Iraq Ireland Japan Persia Switzerland Syria Yugoslavia
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/93/51
- Document Types
- Summary
- File Reference
- CAB 81/93
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0093.051
- Keywords
- British Intelligence Organisation Photographic Reconnaissance Release Of Information Anti-nazi Resistance Demobilisation Intelligence Reports Collapse Of Nazi Germany Captured Documents Operation Tannenbaum Political Intelligence German Archives
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee Chiefs of Staff Deputy Chiefs of Staff Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Bureau Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Joint Intelligence Staff Security Service Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Joint Photographic Reconnaissance Committee
- Pages
- 9
- Persons Discussed
- Francis Inglis Edward King-Salter Stewart Menzies Edmund Rushbrooke John Sinclair
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Intelligence Organization International Relations
