thought it would be wrong for the Sub-Committee to become too closely involved in the work of C.S.T.C., Which Was, moreover, an Anglo-American Committee. MR. VICKERS said that C.S.T.C. Worked within the terms of the bombing directive and did not allocate overall priorities for bombing. The working committees dealt with particular items in the bombing directive, e.g. oil, and made recommendations as to the best means of fulfilling the terms of the directive. The broad strategic appreciation of the Sub-Committee were useful as a background for those who decided the priorities.
- Collection ID
- CAB81
- Conflict
- Second World War
- Countries
- Belgium Japan Netherlands
- Document Reference
- CAB 81/93/17
- Document Types
- Summary
- File Reference
- CAB 81/93
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab81.0093.017
- Keywords
- British Intelligence Organisation Intelligence Services Responsibilities Troop Movements Photographic Reconnaissance Deception Leakage Of Information Attachés
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Ministry of Economic Warfare Political Warfare Executive Security Service Joint Photographic Reconnaissance Committee
- Pages
- 8
- Persons Discussed
- Denis Capel-Dunn Victor Cavendish-Bentinck Edward King-Salter Guy Liddell Stewart Menzies Edmund Rushbrooke Geoffrey Vickers
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Intelligence Organization Intelligence Operations