Minutes of the fifty-sixth Meeting of the sub-committee, held in the Secretary's Room, Great George Street, S.W.1. on Tuesday, 2nd November, 1943, at 10.15 am

(ii) Instructed the Secretary to prepare a brief for the use of the Directors of Intelligence as at (i) above and to be passed to - (a) C.O.S.S.A.C., to be communicated orally to the officers at C.O.S.S.A.C. referred to in J.I.C.(43)432(0), paragraph 8: (b) Joint Staff Mission, Washington, to be communicated orally to Assistant Chief of Staff, G.2 and the Director of Naval Intelligence: (iii) Agreed that as striking developments occurred, the Directors of Intelligence would be responsible for passing the necessary information as at (i) above and the Secretary as at (ii) (a) and (b). (3). In Colonel Vickers' Minute it was further stated that the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy knew a good deal about the rocket. It was, therefore, very difficult in official dealings with them to refuse to talk about it. COLONEL VICKERS said that when he wrote this Minute he had not seen the extract from the Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff meeting referred to above, in which it was stated that the matter should not be discussed below the level of the American officers who were to be informed, unless this was necessary for the preparation of plans to deal with and/or counter the threat. In view of the fact that the U.S. Air Force was closely concerned with action against possible rocket developments and that the American Air Force officers had to be in as close touch with their economic experts as was the case with British Bomber Command and the Ministry of Economic Warfare - in connexion with targets - the Chiefs of Staff ruling would justify M.E.W. officials concerned discussing the rocket, if necessary, with their American opposite numbers. THE SUB-COMMITTEE:- Agreed with the views of Colonel Vickers, as expressed at 'X' above. 2. BRADDOCK II. (J.I.C.(43) 439(0) (Draft)). THE SUB-COMMITTEE had before them a Minute by the Secretary (JIC/1713/43 dated 23rd October, 1943) covering comments by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Intelligence) (ACASI/549/43); and Minute by the Secretary (JIC/1729/43 dated 31st October, 1943) covering comments by Colonel Vickers. THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF (INTELLIGENCE) did not consider that BRADDOCK II should be carried out if it would appreciably affect the bombing offensive. 'X' -2-