Minutes of the twenty-ninth Meeting of the sub-committee, held in the Secretary's Room, Great George Street, S.W.1. on Tuesday, 8th June at 10.15 am

Major-General Cawthorn emphasised most strongly that we were not prepared from the point of view of Intelligence for large operations against Japan. If this state of affairs were to be remedied, steps must be taken at once: (e) Photographic reconnaissance and long-range strategical reconnaissance were lacking also because of the absence of suitable aircraft: (f) For P.W.E. we needed American help because Siam and Japan could not be reached except from China; and we were excluded from the China theatre: (g) There was a lack of economic Intelligence, required for local strategical purposes, choice of air targets, etc. A local organisation was required. The collection of topographical Intelligence was handicapped by the shortage of personnel so that work on all possible theatres could not be carried out simultaneously. The priority list laid down in London was not altogether appropriate and more simultaneous work was advisable from the planning aspect. The question of utilising the services of personnel new only "earmarked" for ultimate service in certain colonial areas might be considered to augment existing strengths of I.S.T.D. This would also ensure that such personnel would still be available when the time came to employ them actively. ter was required. Seven or eight interrogators were trained every four or five months. Lack of instructors prevented an increase: (i) Major-General Cawthorn was satisfied as to the security of India as a base, provided we could restrain the American propaganda which encouraged Congress to hope for American intervention. Our authorities were aware of Japanese activities in India. The North-West Frontier was quiet. He did not consider the continuance of Axis activities from Kabul as serious. (j) Proposals for Combined British-U.S. Intelligence Committee and co-ordination of British and American Intelligence and special organisations. He pointed out that the present situation was highly unsatisfactory. Certain proposals drawn up by Field Marshal Wavell had been submitted by the American Chiefs of Staff to General Stilwell. They had first been discussed and to some extent amended at a meeting in America he had attended, together with the American D.M.I. and representatives of the American organisations concerned. General Stilwell was the Supreme American Army and political authority in the Chinese theatre and had a political adviser. Mr. Davies. Major-General Cawthorn believed that Mr. Davies was using his influence with General Stilwell against the present British proposals. -2-