Minutes of the twenty-third Meeting of the sub-committee, held in the Secretary's Room, Great George Street, S.W.1. on Tuesday, 4th May, 1943 at 10.15 am

"Charter" should be modified so as to extend to the coastal belt. In this connection it was pointed out that from the Air point of view, no clear-cut division between the coastal belt and the remainder of the country was possible. (3) The position regarding Naval Intelligence had not been finally settled, but it was thought that all that was necessary could be obtained from the Naval Intelligence Department by a Naval Liaison Officer. In the course of the general discussion which ensued, the following principal points were made :- (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) The position must be kept fluid, and whatever machinery was now adopted, changes in the organisation would undoubtedly need to be made in the light of experience. The greatest danger was that of the American Headquarters (when formed) getting hold of undigested items of Intelligence from the various Allied Commands in London direct and consequently working against an inaccurate Intelligence background. A further danger was that Intelligence of doubtful value might be sent direct to American General Headquarters from Washington. It was agreed that it would not be possible in practice to prevent American General Headquarters from receiving direct Intelligence from these sources and that the only steps which could be taken to meet this danger were, first, to ensure that whenever American General Headquarters received direct Intelligence reports from either Washington or other Allies, copies would at once be rendered to the Intelligence Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander; and, secondly, to train and "educate" the American Intelligence staff officers to detect the worthlessness of much of this undigested Intelligence so that they would not be influenced by it. In this connection, it was stated that arrangements were being made for a number of American staff officers to work in the Intelligence Branch of General Headquarters, Home Forces, so as to gain experience. The suggestion that an American officer might be co-opted to the London Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee was considered impracticable. The Sub-Committee felt that all references to S.O.E. in General Whitefoord's memorandum should be deleted, and also that it would be sufficient if the General attended those meetings of the "Y" Board at which matters directly concerning C.O.S. (S.A.C.) were discussed without his becoming a member of the Board. On political questions, the Intelligence Staff of C.O.S. (S.A.C.) should keep in touch with the Services Liaison Department of the Foreign office. -2-