Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the sub-committee, held in the Secretary's Room, Great George Street, S.W.1. on Tuesday, 9th March, at 10.15 am

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Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the sub-committee, held in the Secretary's Room, Great George Street, S.W.1. on Tuesday, 9th March, at 10.15 am

would be inappropriate to Intelligence reports issued by the Security Service. THE CHAIRMAN AND COLONEL VICKERS indicated that in appropriate cases the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare might make use of the agreed grading system. THE SUB-COMMITTEE:- Agreed that the system of grading Intelligence (but not inference) in force in the Royal Navy should be extended to the Army and the Royal Air Force; and that it should also be introduced so far as convenient in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic warfare. 3. AXIS FORCES IN TUNISIA. THE SUB-COMMITTEE had before them a Minute by the Secretary (JIC/295/43 dated 5th March, 1943) covering a letter addressed to the Secretary by the Special Operations Executive on the subject of the priority that should be given to attempts by S.O.E. to interfere with the Italians railway system or to delay the transport of war material to North Africa during the coming weeks. In discussion the following points were made:- (a) S.O.E.'s figure of 250,000 for the total of Axis forces in Tunisia was somewhat on the high side, 220,000 being the War Office estimate: (b) S.O.E.'s figure of 5,000 tons a day for the Axis maintenance requirements in Tunisia was too high. The War Office estimate was 2,500 tons per day for the maintenance of the Axis forces in Tunisia in active operations. In fact, during February only 1,700 tons a day had been transported and this had apparently proved sufficient, though this figure probably did not permit the building up of any reserve: (c) The limiting factor on the quantity of stores conveyed to the enemy force in Tunisia was not the difficulty of communications in Italy itself, but the collection of shipping and the organisation of convoys and sailings. There was evidence that considerable stocks of supplies were accumulating at the ports. It followed, therefore, that the best means of reducing the quantity of stores transported by the enemy to Tunisia was to stop convoys sailing and to sink the ships on passage rather than to attack communications inside Italy: (d) Operations by S.O.E. against communications in Italy could probably only have an important effect if carried out over a long period. The organisation of the transport of explosives for instance, would take some time to arrange. -2-
Collection ID
CAB81
Conflict
Second World War
Document Reference
CAB 81/91/14
File Reference
CAB 81/91
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab81.0091.014
Keywords
British Military Mission Anglo-soviet Relations Information Sharing Intelligence Distribution Military Situation Reports Assessing Enemy Strength Military Supplies Communications Diplomatic Signals Censorship Courts-martial Manpower Technology
Pages
6
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
War Cabinet: Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee: Minutes (JIC Series).
Themes
Intelligence Organisation and Administration Foreign Policy and International Relations