(b) As regards political and tribal intelligence, we should mainly rely on the political Vice-Consuls to provide general intelligence. From this it follows that the Vice-Consuls must be at their posts as soon as possible and in all cases not later than September. (c) C.I.C.I. records would be transferred to A.H.Q., Habbaniya, where collation would be handled by the A.O.C.'s intelligence staff, augmented by some of C.I.C.I's present personnel. Whether all M.I.5 records should be treated in the some way would be a matter for the M.I.5 representative to decide when he comes out.
- Collection ID
- CAB176
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Iraq
- Document Reference
- CAB 176/12/5
- Document Types
- Memorandum Correspondence
- File Reference
- CAB 176/12
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab176.0012.005
- Keywords
- Anglo-iraqi Relations British Intelligence Organisation Anti-british Feeling Foreign Policy Diplomacy Intelligence Services Responsibilities
- Languages
- English
- Note
- Sections of this document were retained under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act, 1958.
- Organizations
- Foreign Office Security Service Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Ministry of Defence
- Pages
- 3
- Persons Discussed
- John Gardiner Stewart Menzies Percy Sillitoe
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- International Relations Intelligence Organization
