|Document Title||1. The Communist Threat to Burmese and Siamese Rice Supplies; 2. "Crachin" Scotch Mist Season in Indo-China; 3. Requests for Specimens of Captured Equipment; 4. Likely Scale of Strategic Air Attacks on Malaya and Borneo Up to the End of 1952; 5. United States O.N.E. Reports|
|Document Date||14 March 1951|
|Themes||Military Intelligence and Operations, Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance|
|Regions||East Asia, Europe, North America, South Asia|
|Countries||Ceylon, China, India, Indochina, Korea, Malaya, Siam, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States of America|
|Document Type||Meeting Minutes|
|Organisations||British Joint Services Mission, Central Intelligence Agency, Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Office, Joint Intelligence Bureau, Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), Joint Intelligence Staff, Ministry of Defence, Security Service, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee|
|People||John Gardiner, Guy Liddell, Stewart Menzies, Percy Sillitoe|
communism, colonies, geographic intelligence, empire, imperial defence, food supplies, agriculture, trade, contingency planning, predicting enemy intentions, intelligence reports, intelligence requirements, resources, intelligence services responsibilities, climate, meteorological intelligence, First Indochina War, military intelligence, aerial reconnaissance, equipment, intelligence gathering, captured equipment, strategy, bombing, air raids, former colonies, air raid precautions, threat of war with the USSR, assessing enemy strength, air power, air warfare, military objectives, defence, American intelligence services, information sharing, intelligence channels, military supplies, training, biological warfare, chemical warfare
1. Chinese Communist Threat in the Far East and South East Asia; 2. Consideration of Reports by Joint Intelligence Committees Abroad; 3. Effects of Events in Korea on the Threats to Formosa, Tibet, Hong Kong and Indo-China; 4. Possible Military Operations in South-East Asia by the Chinese Communist Armed Forces between 1952 and 1956; 5. Likely Scale of Strategic Air Attacks on South East Asia in the Event of War with Russia; 6. Relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Parties in Burma and French Indo-China; 7. Communism in the Far East as at 31st March 1950; 8. Requirements for Clandestine Reporting in Western Europe in the Event of a Successful Soviet Invasion; 9. Threat to Yugoslavia; 10. Intelligence Liaison with the Americans in the Far East; 11. Mr. H.N. Brain
1. Operation "Mincemeat"; 2. The Vulnerability of the United Kingdom to a Knock-Out Blow by the Soviet Union; 3. Professor Pontecorvo; 4. Scientific and Technical Intelligence Branch, Germany; 5. Air Survey in Indo-China; 6. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities - 1950/54; 7. Attendance at Social Functions by Service Attaches in Sweden; 8. Soviet Preparedness for War; 9. Scale and Nature of Initial Air Attack on the United Kingdom; 10. Present State of Intelligence and Measures to Improve It
1. Indications of Soviet Preparations for Event War; 2. The Military, Political and Economic Strength and Weaknesses of Communist China in 1951; 3. Defence of South East Asia in the Event of Chinese Aggression; 4. O.N.E. Report on Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany (NIE-4); 5. Estimate of the Scale and Nature of a Soviet Attack on the United Kingdom between Now and Mid 1952; 6. Clandestine Air Photographic Recconnaisation; 7. O.N.E. Report on Turkey's Position in the East-West Struggle (NIE-9); 8. O.N.E. Report on the Probability of an Invasion of Yogoslavia in 1951 (NIE-29)
1. Invasion of the United Kingdom; 2. Scale and Nature of Air Attack on the United Kingdom 1951-1954; 3. Chinese Communist Intentions in the Light of Operations in Korea; 4. Review of the Situation round the Soviet and Satellite Perimeter; 5. J.I.C. Weekly Intelligence Review (Europe) for S.H.A.P.E.; 6.; 7. Intelligence for S.H.A.P.E.
1. Threat to Hong Kong; 2. Priorities for the Collection of Intelligence in the Far East; 3. The Possibility of the Survival of the Chinese Nationalists as a Factor in Far East Affairs; 4. Assault on Formosa - Intentions an Capabilities of the Chinese Communists; 5. Possible Scale and Nature of Raids on the United Kingdom in a War in 1949/50; 6. Beach Reconnaissances - Middle East; 7. Policy and Procedure for Handling Defectors.
1. Mr. D.P. Reilly; 2. Meetings of the J.I.C. Over the Easter Holiday Period; 3. Planning after the Opening Phase of a General War; 4. Visit of Dr. Sherman Kent, Office of National Estimates, to the J.I.C.; 5. Review of the Situation Round the Soviet and Satellite Perimeter and other Sensitive Area; 6. Discussion with Dr. Sherman Kent, O.N.E. 7. Organisation within Saceur's Command for Progressing Enemy Documents in time of War; 8. J.T.I.C. - Terms of Reference
1. Chinese Nationalist Intentions; 2. Visit of the United States Director of Naval Intelligence to the United Kingdom; 3.; 4. Article on Intelligence in the 'Sunday Express' of 3rd June, 1951; 5. Meeting with Mr. Creswell; 6. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities; 7. Review of the Situation Round the Soviet and Satellite Perimeter; 8. J.I.C. Weekly Intelligence Review (Europe) for S.H.A.P.E.
1. Meeting with the Joint Intelligence Staff; 2. Photographic Intelligence and Survey Requirements in the Middle East; 3. Scale and Nature of Initial Air Attack on the United Kingdom - 1957; 4. Intelligence Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation to the Five Power Military Committee; 5. Political Activities in South East Asia with Special Reference to Communism; 6. Russian Preparedness for War; 7. Visit of the Chairman to the Middle East and Far East; 8. Evidence of Certain Soviet Activities
1. Threat to the Levant and Egypt Arising Out of the Soviet Occupation of Azerbaijan or Persia; 2. The Threat to LAOS and SIAM; 3. United States O.N.E. Reports; 4. Exchange of Intelligence with the Turks; 5. Clandestine Air Photographic Reconnaissance; 6. Vulnerability of China; 7. Defence of South-East Asia in the Event of Chinese Aggression - Intelligence Appreciation