Minutes of the Forty-eighth Meeting of the Committee Held in Conference Room "H", at the Ministry of Defence, S.W.I, on Thursday, 11th May, 1950, at 10.30 a.m.

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Minutes of the Forty-eighth Meeting of the Committee Held in Conference Room "H", at the Ministry of Defence, S.W.I, on Thursday, 11th May, 1950, at 10.30 a.m.

TOP SECRET were now ahead of schedule in clearing up the frontier areas. The only fear now was that supply of arms to Viet Minh might check progress. The frontier was open and there was no means of preventing arms coming in from China by land. The Joint Intelligence Committee, Far East, had been studying the logistical problems of an attack being launched on Malaya through French Indo-China in the event of a major war. They had concluded that it would take a year to 15 months for a sizeable force to reach the Malaya frontier. If French Indo-China fell to the Communists before war, that period might be shortened to nine months. If both French Indo-China and Siam came under Communist control, say one year before a major war occurred, the period might only be four months. Under the latter circumstances, the Planners had estimated that those four months were inadequate for Malaya to be reinforced. Strategically therefore the holding of French Indo-China against the Communists in advance of war was essential to the security of Malaya. He considered that with adequate assistance to French Indo-China over that afforded to Viet Minh, there was a fair chance of the position being held. Formosa. As regards the likelihood of the Chinese Nationalists being able to hold Formosa against Communist attack, from the military point of view, the Nationalists ought to be able to hold the Island. The Nationalists were, however, Chinese and their capabilities therefore somewhat unpredictable. No foreigners were popular with the local inhabitants but it was considered that the Formosans were more appalled at the prospect of a Communist regime than they were at continued Nationalist occupation. The Communists had insufficient craft and air support to make a coherent landing so that if an attack were made within the next six months, it would probably fail. The Joint Intelligence Committee, Far East, did not agree that if the Chusan Islands fell quickly, morale in Formosa would collapse. Particular attention was, however, being paid to any move of Communist troops southward from the forces concentrated in the Shanghai area since it was unlikely that an attack would be launched on Formosa until such a southward deployment had been made. The Communists were at present concentrated against the Chusan Islands and an attack on those islands was therefore likely. With air support, assisted by the Russians, it was estimated that Chusan would fall within two weeks of an attack. Burma. On his recent return from a visit to Rangoon, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald had said that the military successes of the Government had shown a glimmer of light in the present situation. The critical point was whether the Government, having cleared the railway axis north of Mandalay, could then turn south down the Irrawaddy axis and inflict a substantial defeat on the Communists before the latter's negotiations with the Chinese Communists had been completed. As regards Korea, he was more optimistic following his recent visit and the South Koreans appeared to be dealing satisfactorily with the guerillas, assisted by the Americans. In Indonesia the prophesied outburst of disorder had not occurred. In Siam the Government were turning more in our direction. As regards the area as a whole as viewed from Singapore, there were thus three main priorities of concern to intelligence, namely, the build up of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists in the Shanghai area, particularly in the air, as affecting an attack on Formosa: the Tongking frontier and assistance to Viet Minh from the north: and the support from outside of clandestine movements in South-East Asia including -2-
Collection ID
CAB159
Conflict
Cold War
Document Reference
CAB 159/7/5
File Reference
CAB 159/0007
Identifier
10.1080/swwf.cab159.0007.050
Keywords
British Intelligence Organisation Intelligence Gathering Intelligence Requirements Intelligence Channels Colonies Empire Foreign Policy Diplomatic Intelligence Hong Kong Invasion Threat Chinese Foreign Policy First Indochina War Military Situation Reports Military Operations Military Intelligence Chinese Nationalists Former Colonies Intelligence Services Responsibilities Information Sharing Intelligence Distribution Release Of Information Personnel Leakage Of Information Secrecy Security Soviet Agents Defence Alliances Treaties Occupation Arrangements Threat Of War With The Ussr Contingency Planning War Preparations Predicting Enemy Intentions Attachés Consular Intelligence Sources Iron Curtain Soviet Satellite States Soviet Foreign Policy Occupied Austria
Pages
10
Published in
United Kingdom
Series
Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office: Central Intelligence Machinery: Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Later Committee: Minutes (JIC Series). Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. Meetings 1 (0)-60 (0)
Themes
Foreign Policy and International Relations Military Intelligence and Operations Intelligence Organisation and Administration