Minutes of the Thirty-sixth Meeting of the Committee, Held in Conference Room "G", at the Ministry of Defence, S.W.1. on Friday, 31st March, 1950 at 10.45 a.m.

TOP SECRET arrangements could be made for Brigadier Boucher to be made available as leader of the United Kingdom Team at the next meeting. It was generally agreed that at their next meeting with the Chiefs of Staff, the Directors of Intelligence should draw their attention to the basis regarding Soviet production of atomic bombs on which it was intended that the long term intelligence appreciation should be made. THE COMMITTEE:- (1) Instructed the Secretary to circulate a draft telegram to the Joint Intelligence Committee, Washington, inviting them to approach the United States Joint Intelligence Committee on the lines indicated in discussion. (2) Invited the Director of Military Intelligence to take note of their views regarding the appointment of a Chairman for the United Kingdom Team for the next combined meeting. (3) Pending receipt of the views of the United States Joint Intelligence Committee, agreed that Departments should begin preparatory work for the preparation of a long term intelligence appreciation. 2. ATOMIC WEAPONS - SCALE OF ATTACK ON THE UNITED KINGDOM TOP SECRET (Previous Reference: J.I.C.(50) 33rd Meeting, Minute 5). THE COMMITTEE considered a minute+ by the Secretary covering a draft statement on the scale of attack of atomic weapons on the United Kingdom in the period up to the end of 1951, as guidance for the Civil Defence Joint Planning Staff. REAR-ADMIRAL LONGLEY-COOK said that the draft statement contained combined United States/United Kingdom information of the highest secrecy, besides references to the Committee's latest views on the likelihood of war. He did not therefore consider that, in its present form, the statement was suitable, on security grounds, for circulation to Civil Defence authorities. The Civil Defence Planners were aware that an atomic explosion had taken place in the Soviet Union and had simply asked whether, in the short term, they should take account of the possibility of an atomic attack on this country and on what scale. He therefore suggested that considerable omissions should be made from the draft statement in order to restrict its scope to the guidance actually required. There was general agreement with these views. The draft statement was then considered paragraph by paragraph and certain amendments were suggested and approved. It was also agreed that paragraph 5 should be re-worded to accord more clearly with the Committee's recent appreciations and that a suitable form of words should be agreed between the Air Ministry and the Secretary. + J.I.C./549/50. -2-