Minutes of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the Committee, Held in Conference Room "G" at the Ministry of Defence, S.W.I, on Friday, 3rd March, 1950 at 10.45 a.m.

TOP SECRET MAJOR GENERAL SHORTT said that he was still not entirely satisfied regarding the conclusions concerning the date. From the purely military point of view, as Director of Military Intelligence he could say that there was no reason why the Soviet army should not be ready for a major war in 1952. The present planning date had, he understood, been arrived at principally on considerations of Soviet possession of the atomic bomb. In arriving at any conclusion concerning altering the existing planning date we should make clear the grounds on which our estimates were being based. REAR-ADMIRAL LONGLEY-COOK said that the Soviet Union maintained no reserve fleet and had all their ships in commission so that the Soviet navy could be considered ready for war now, although for the reasons stated in the report it would be in a stronger position after 1954. AIR VICE MARSHAL OGILVIE-FORBES said that the principal air factors were the capacity of the Soviet air forces for delivering atomic bombs and Soviet anti-aircraft defences. Evidence on the Soviet long range bomber force and on anti- aircraft defences was, however, so slight that firm estimates of the dates of readiness could not be reached. DR. BLOUNT said that so far as weapons of mass destruction were concerned, the dates 1951 and 1952 were generally applicable. He considered, however, that the determining factor would be the economic situation. MAJOR GENERAL STRONG said that economic considerations would probably play an overriding part in any assessment of the Soviet leaders as to when they could consider themselves ready for a major war of indefinite duration. The present estimate of the Joint Intelligence Bureau was not based on any comparisons with Western economic potential but on the circumstances under which the Soviet leaders would feel confident of their ability successfully to wage such a war. These included the dispersal of industry, improvements in rail communications, stockpiling of strategic materials, improvements in industrial efficiency and any such measures as could be afforded to raise the standard of living of the population. Specific dates could not be estimated but he maintained the view that from the economic point of view the Soviet leaders would not consider themselves ready for a major war of indefinite duration until some date in 1955/56. REAR-ADMIRAL LONGLEY-COOK suggested that, in the light of the arguments in Part I of the report, it would be more realistic to entitle Part II "The date by which the Soviet Leaders might be prepared to take greater risks of a major war". Such a change of title might entail minor consequential amendments in Part I of the report. There was general agreement with this suggestion. In discussion it was agreed that paragraph 19 of the Annex to the report and conclusion (f) would require re-drafting in the light of their discussion. Paragraph 19 should be divided into sub-paragraphs covering the army, navy and air aspects on the lines stated by the respective Directors of Intelligence above, -2-