|Document Title||1. Arrangement of Agenda for Meetings; 2. Review of Work in Hand; 3. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities; 4. Soviet Interests, Intentions and Capabilities; 5. Soviet Use of Atomic Bombs; 6. Review of Soviet Economic and Military Activities during the Year Ending 31st December, 1949; 7. Arms for German Police in Soviet Zone of Germany; 8. Meeting with Chairman, Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee|
|Document Date||27 January 1950|
|Themes||Intelligence Organisation and Administration, Military Intelligence and Operations, Weapons Technology and Nuclear Warfare|
|Regions||East Asia, Europe|
|Countries||China, Germany, Russia, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia|
|Document Type||Meeting Minutes|
|Organisations||Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Office, Joint Intelligence Bureau, Joint Intelligence Staff, Ministry of Defence, Security Service, Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee|
|People||Valentine Boucher, Stewart Menzies, Patrick Reilly, Arthur Shortt, Percy Sillitoe, Kenneth Strong|
British intelligence organisation, intelligence requirements, intelligence services responsibilities, intelligence gathering, intelligence reports, predicting enemy intentions, assessing enemy strength, threat of war with the USSR, contingency planning, military intelligence, military strength, war preparations, Soviet foreign policy, resources, industry, economic intelligence, strategy, Soviet satellite states, foreign policy, atomic warfare, armaments, military objectives, economy, police, occupied Germany, occupation arrangements, allies, personnel
1. Yugoslav Service Attache in London; 2. Meeting with the Joint Intelligence Staff; 3. Strategic Implications of a Break with the Chinese Government; 4. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities - Long Term Appreciation; 5. Work in Hand by the Joint Intelligence Staff; 6. Intelligence Division, C.C.G. - Report by Sir Philip Vickery; 7. Russian Knowledge of Western Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Plans; 8. Threat to Yugoslavia; 9. Views of a German Ex-Staff Officer on Russia and Probable Russian Strategy
1. Operation "matchbox"; 2. Intelligence Organisation, Pakistan; 3. Possibility of Russian Armed Action Against Yugoslavia; 4. Release of United States Information to Third Countries; 5. Tibet; 6. Photographic Reconnaissance of French Indo-china; 7. Soviet Strategic Intentions and Capabilities; 8. Future Defence Policy.
1. Possible Courses of Action by the Soviet Union in Order to Regain Complete Control over Yugoslavia; 2. Long Term Intelligence on Soviet Preparedness for War; 3. Armed Forces in the Far East as at 1st October, 1948; 4. Charter for the Joint Intelligence Committee, Far East; 5.; 6. Likelihood of French Withdrawal from French Indo-China; 7. The Effect of the Communists Gaining Control of Greece; 8.
1. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities; 2. Monthly Meeting with the Joint Intelligence Staff; 3. Formosa - Chinese Communist Intentions and Capabilities; 4. Periodical Reports on the Threat to Hong- Kong; 5. Russian Preparedness for War; 6. Possibility of Russian Armed Action Against Yugoslavia; 7. Scientific and Technical Intelligence.
1. Conduct of the Work of the Committee; 2. Reports on Communism; 3. The Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union and the Date by Which the Soviet Leaders Might Be Prepared to Risk It; 4. Soviet Use of Atomic Bombs; 5. Threat to Yugoslavia; 6. Implications of the Soviet Union Regaining Control of Yugoslavia; 7. Russian Preparedness for War
1. Communist Threat in South-East Asia and the Far East; 2. Statement by Sir Percy Sillitoe; 3. Review of Work in Hand; 4. Monthly Meeting with the Joint Intelligence Staff; 5. Soviet Production of Atomic Weapons; 6. Threat to Yugoslavia; 7. Basic Intelligence for Western Europe Commanders-in-Chief Committee and Regional Planning Groups; 8. Effect on the Countries of Western Europe of a Protracted Period of Soviet Occupation; 9. Russian Preparedness for War; 10. Meeting with Chairman, Canadian J.I.C; 11. Joint Intelligence Bureau, Ceylon; 12. Evacuation of German Scientists in an Emergency; 13. Proposal That Soviet Tankers Should Call at Kuweit
1. Mr. S.E.V. Luke; 2. The Employment of the Soviet Navy and Soviet air Forces in the Maritime Role at the Out-Break of General war up to the End of 1956; 3. MIG-15 Aircraft; 4. Review of the Situation Round the Soviet and Satellite Perimeter and other Sensitive Areas; 5. Future of British Intelligence Organisation (Germany); 6. Priorities in Defence Intelligence Requirements; 7. Charter for the J.I.C. (Germany); 8. Russian Postal Censhorship Reports; 9. Provision of Information for Eucom; 10. Intelligence for the Germans after Ratification of the Conn Convention; 11. Operational Planning by Cs-in-C. Germany '55-56; 12. B.I.O.(G) - Personnel; 13. Release of Information to the E.D.C.; 14. Report of the Tripartite Security Working Group 1951; 15. Next Visit of Major General Kirkman
1. "Intelligence Digest"; 2. The Dangers of Clandestine Communist Attack on the Economic Plants and Animals of the Commonwealth; 3. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities. - Anglo-U.S. Intelligence Conference; 4. Certain Intelligence Mobilisation Plans; 5. Soviet Preparedness for War; 6. Scale and Nature of Threat to Sea Communications in the Event of War with the Soviet Union in 1954; 7. Chairman's Visit to Germany; 8. Possible Uses by the Soviet Union of Satellite Forces; 9. Operation "Matchbox"; 10. Likelihood of War with the Soviet Union and the Date by Which the Soviet Leaders Might Be Prepared to Risk It; 11. August Bank Holiday Arrangements - 1950
1. J.I.C. Weekly Intelligence Review (Europe) for S.H.A.P.E.; 2. Review of the Situation Round the Soviet and Satellite Perimeter; 3. Chiefs of Staff Meeting with Lord Tedder; 4. Atomic Energy and Guided Weapons Programmes-Downgrading of Top Secret Documents; 5. Visit of D.N.I. to Rome; 6. Review of the State of Our Intelligence and Measures Recommended to Improve It; 7. Port Energency Planning; 8. Exchange of Intelligence with India and Pakistan; 9. Tripartite Military Staff Talks on the Defence of South-East Asia; 10. Requests by Yugoslavia for Special Equipment; 11. Short Term Effects of Air Attack Against Supply Bases and Communications in Manchuria