Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the Committee, Held in Conference Room "G", at the Ministry of Defence, S.W.I, on Friday, 27th January, 1950 at 10,45 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL In discussion, it was generally agreed that this matter should be considered by the members of the Committee and discussed further at a future meeting. THE COMMITTEE:- Agreed to review at their meeting (Directors) the following week the list of reports in course of preparation. 3. SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES TOP SECRET (Previous Reference: J.I.C. (50) 3rd Meeting, Minute 5). THE COMMITTEE had before them a revised draft report+ for submitting the Combined Anglo/American/Canadian Intelligence Appreciation≠ to the Chiefs of Staff. CAPTAIN BAKER-CRESSWELL, referring to paragraph 3 of the report, said that he was not clear as to the extent to which economic factors were considered to affect the probable date when the Soviet union would be prepared for a major war. In a previous reportØ it had been stated that it was unlikely that, before the end of 1956, the Soviet Union would be capable of supporting her armed forces entirely from the natural resources and industrial potential now under her control in any major war, except a short one. The inference behind this statement did not appear to be in line with the thought expressed in the report under consideration. MAJOR GENERAL STRONG said that the ability of the Soviet Union to wage a major war depended largely on the amount of opposition which would be encountered. If there was to be no opposition then it might be said that the Soviet Union would be ready to go to war almost immediately; such a war, however, would probably not be regarded as a major war. He considered that if the choice were left to the Soviet Union, she would probably prefer to put her economy in order before embarking on a major war. This would mean that she would probably not consider herself fully prepared until the beginning of 1956 when the next five-year plan would be completed. Although, therefore, on the assumption that the Soviet Union would wish to put her economy in order before going to war, the Joint Intelligence Bureau would not disagree with the choice of 1956/57 as the probable earliest date for a war, they considered it desirable to counter the view that the economy of the Soviet Union would necessarily deteriorate rapidly in a war before that time. DR. BLOUNT expressed the view that the use of atomic bombs might open up possibilities of a war in the near future in which the Soviet Union would encounter very little opposition. He suggested that Soviet strategy might be to carry out a surprise attack with atomic bombs on the United Kingdom and take advantage of the repercussions which such an attack might have on the other Western European nations to send her troops to occupy them. + J.I.C. (49) 109 (Revised Draft). ≠ J.I.C. (49) 80. Ø J.I.C. (48) 121 (Final). -2-