SECRET ircuits, of which this was a part, and Commonwealth Governments had agreed that Service circuits would not take any traffic which could be regarded as commercial traffic. MR. FROST said that there were three factors which should be taken into account in considering whether monitoring material from Cyprus should be transmitted by Cable and Wireless or on a Service link. The first was the question of efficiency; there were liable to be considerable delays in Cable and Wireless transmission, particularly if the material had to be encyphered.
- Collection ID
- CAB159
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Australia Ceylon Cyprus India New Zealand Pakistan United Kingdom United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 159/6/8
- Document Types
- Summary
- File Reference
- CAB 159/6
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab159.0006.008
- Keywords
- American Intelligence Services Anglo-american Relations Wireless Communications Communications Interception Liaison Broadcast Services Intelligence Requirements Communications Intelligence Channels Intelligence Gathering Signals Security Secrecy Geographic Intelligence British Intelligence Organisation Intelligence Services Responsibilities Occupied Japan Photographic Reconnaissance Aerial Reconnaissance Mapping Topographical Intelligence Former Colonies Information Sharing Armaments Military Intelligence Military Organisation Military Strength Diplomacy Release Of Information
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Central Intelligence Agency Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Bureau Joint Intelligence Committee (Washington) Ministry of Defence Security Service United Nations Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 11
- Persons Discussed
- John Gardiner Stewart Menzies Percy Sillitoe
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Intelligence Organization International Relations
