rehabilitation of the devastated areas of Russia and the preference, for ideological reasons, for carrying out a "cold war" rather than the taking of a course which would lead to further mutual devastation, were also powerful deterrents. There was general agreement with the amendments suggested by the Director of Naval Intelligence on this point, subject to the substitution of the words "one of the major factors" for" the greatest single factor." (ii) It was not agreed that the present relative military preparedness in all arms of the Russians over the Anglo/American democracies was greater than was ever likely to be achieved in the future.
- Collection ID
- CAB159
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Germany Nazi Germany Palestine Russia Soviet Union United Kingdom United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 159/4/15
- Document Types
- Summary
- File Reference
- CAB 159/4
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab159.0004.015
- Keywords
- Diplomatic Officials Consular Intelligence Sources Intelligence Requirements Mobilisation Threat Of War With The Ussr Soviet Foreign Policy Predicting Enemy Intentions Contingency Planning Assessing Enemy Strength War Preparations Atomic Warfare Armaments Military Intelligence Aircraft Military Supplies Equipment Jews Soviet Satellite States Intelligence Services Responsibilities Intelligence Reports British Intelligence Organisation Intelligence Channels Inter-services Cooperation
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Foreign Office Joint Intelligence Bureau Ministry of Defence Security Service Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 6
- Persons Discussed
- John Gardiner William Hayter Stewart Menzies Douglas Packard Lawrence Pendred Percy Sillitoe Kenneth Strong
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Intelligence Organization Military Intelligence International Relations
