2 TOP SECRET (b) to provide a dispassionate view of the overall employment of Soviet maritime forces before attempting to assess the threat to our sea communications; (c) to provide a basis from which detailed estimates can be made of both the threat to our sea communications and the opposition which we should be likely to meet in attacking Soviet communications. 7. The broad conclusions which emerge from our study are as follows :— Northern Area (a) All naval and naval air forces in the Northern area, except for the large submarines, are likely to be employed initially in defence of the Northern bases and sea communications, and in direct and indirect support of land and amphibious operations against Scandinavia.
- Collection ID
- CAB158
- Conflict
- Cold War
- Countries
- Albania Belgium Bulgaria China Denmark East Germany England France Germany Netherlands Norway Poland Russia Scotland Soviet Union Spain Sweden Turkey United Kingdom United States of America
- Document Reference
- CAB 158/15/40
- Document Types
- Report Memorandum Map
- File Reference
- CAB 158/15
- Identifier
- 10.1080/swwf.cab158.0015.040
- Keywords
- Military Intelligence Assessing Enemy Strength Predicting Enemy Intentions Contingency Planning Threat Of War With The Ussr War Preparations Strategy Military Objectives Soviet Air Force Soviet Navy Air Power Air Warfare Naval Strength Naval Warfare Geographic Intelligence Warships War Materials Weapons Production Defence Anti-aircraft Defence Coastal Defence Submarines Bombing Air Raids Atomic Warfare Military Operations Mines Blockades Amphibious Operations Manpower
- Languages
- English
- Organizations
- Chiefs of Staff Ministry of Defence Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
- Pages
- 45
- Persons Discussed
- Anthony Buzzard Charles Carstairs Francis Fressanges Patrick Reilly Eric Searight Arthur Shortt Kenneth Strong
- Published in
- United Kingdom
- Themes
- Military Intelligence
